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Abstract 
This paper challenges the narrowly founded but untroubled consensus about the alleged 
benefits of the Conservative government’s devolution programme. It suggests that too much 
attention has been paid to purported benefits and too little regard to the potential risks. It 
draws attention to international evidence that suggests that the distribution of the benefits 
of devolution is crucially dependent on its design.  It critically examines the case for the 
currently offered model of devolution and finds the underpinning economic model and 
limited forms of democratic accountability are likely to produce regressive social outcomes 
and the reinforcement of existing local elites. It calls for a wider public debate and a fuller 
democratic scrutiny of the model of devolution on offer. 
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Introduction 
We live on the cusp of an age of localism and decentralisation that will bring benefits in terms 
of improved economic development and enhanced democratic accountability. This, at least, 
is the new ruling orthodoxy. A recent and broadly representative expression of the 
conventional wisdom was offered by Grant Thornton/Localis, which added to the 
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proliferation of think tank reports outlining the purported advantages of the Conservative 
government’s ‘devolution’ programme. According to this analysis, the benefits of ‘devolution’ 
are fivefold. First, fiscal devolution will aid rebalancing because this will create ‘self-reliant 
cities’ which prove to be ‘more resilient’. Second, local government is more efficient than 
central government, as demonstrated by its ability to absorb public expenditure cuts. Third, 
devolution offers a way of invigorating local democracy. To wit, ‘with more power vesting at 
the local level and the associated local media coverage, there should follow greater 
democratic engagement’.  Fourth, devolved government will mean that SMES will be able ‘to 
plug into the public service supply chain’. Finally, decentralisation will allow innovative 
approaches to place-based and outcome-focused services.2 
 
There is no denying that England is a highly centralised jurisdiction and there is a strong case 
for devolution. But this does not preclude the case for careful scrutiny of the claims on which 
the government’s case for its programme rests. In several ways, the report by Grant 
Thornton/Localis encapsulates the weaknesses in the way in which the debate about 
decentralisation in England is currently framed. Firstly, the focus on the benefits precludes 
consideration of the potential costs of devolution, which might be expected to arise as a result 
of large scale political and administrative change. Secondly, the claims outlined above are 
largely unsupported by evidence. Indeed, each of these claims can be challenged. For 
instance, self-reliance can be source of weakness for cities as well as strength; the relationship 
between devolution and democratic renewal is highly uncertain, especially in a context where 
local media are weak and declining; public procurement rules will remain a matter of national 
and European legislation in ways that are likely to limit the scope of local action. The forms of 
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devolution proposed in England are highly constrained and limited. More generally, the 
debate about the government’s devolution plans is occluded by an absence of historical and 
comparative perspective. For instance, press coverage in North East England was breathless 
with the possibility of a “historic devolution deal” which would gift the region a £30m per 
annum infrastructure fund and the possibility of additional levy, subject to an elected Mayor 
being imposed on the region. Yet, these resources compare poorly to the £222m per annum 
allocated in 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review to One North East (the development 
agency established by the previous Labour government and subsequently abolished by the 
Coalition). This paper challenges the narrowly founded but untroubled consensus about the 
benefits of the government’s devolution programme. 
 
A Global Trend? 
Decentralisation of government and governance is an international phenomenon that is seen 
to meet multiple objectives of increasing the efficiency of public services, improving 
legitimacy and accountability of political institutions, fostering the growth of local and 
regional economies and incubating policy innovation – creating ‘laboratories of democracy’ 
in the words of the US Supreme Court Judge, Louis Brandeis. Internationally, we can identify 
a widespread, if highly heterogeneous, trend toward decentralisation by national 
governments. Differences in approaches to decentralisation are conditioned by broader 
processes of globalisation, the growing complexity of the state and growing demands upon it 
and the variety of motivations and national contexts (historical, political, economic, cultural) 
in which it has been introduced. The assertion of territorial identities was a key rationale in 
early shifts toward more decentralised state structures, but latterly economic arguments 
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have dominated as governments seek an ‘economic dividend’ from decentralisation in terms 
of efficiency gains and improved economic growth.  
 
In the UK, these arguments appear to carry greater weight in a context of weak national 
recovery from a severe recession, enduring public and private indebtedness and deep and 
lasting austerity.  Governments and international organisations such as the World Bank, 
Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and European Union (EU), 
expect decentralisation to deliver more efficient local services and provide greater stimulus 
to local economic growth. The recent government policy agenda in England constitutes a 
particular version of these broader processes and rationales in focusing, at various times, 
upon the relationship between decentralisation, localism and the ‘Big Society’. The current 
case made for devolution in England similarly rests on claims made about its anticipated 
contribution to improved efficiency in the delivery of public services and the promotion of 
local economic growth as part of efforts to ‘rebalance’ the UK economy.  But as I will argue 
below, there is something distinctively regressive about the Conservative approach in England 
which is likely to frustrate its avowed aims, although it may yet serve the strategies of the 
Conservative  party and some Labour local government interests.  
 
The international literature on decentralisation is focused upon the redistribution of power 
and resources to lower tiers of government. The literature produces ambiguous and, at times, 
contradictory findings about the impacts of decentralisation on governance, public services, 
local economic growth and wellbeing. These are partly the result of data and methodological 
limitations and a product of the questions that are asked. For example, we find quite 
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contradictory evidence about the impacts of decentralisation on the efficiency of local 
services, reflecting the difficulties in finding adequate means of measurement and data and 
depending upon the specific policy areas addressed: some studies report improvements in 
outputs and others report deteriorations across different sectors such as health, education, 
and transport3.  
 
In addition, the literature on decentralisation tends, with one or two exceptions, does not 
draw strong distinctions between the efficacies of different tiers of sub-national government 
covering a variety of spatial scales, tending instead to explore the principles of 
decentralisation itself. As an international phenomenon decentralisation has adopted many 
forms and been enacted at different spatial scales. Thus, much of the international literature 
is concerned with decentralisation to the regional instead of — or as well as — the local scale 
and terms such as regionalisation, decentralisation and devolution are often used 
interchangeably and/or inconsistently. A systematic review of existing studies reveals the 
challenges of analysing decentralisation processes at the local scale and casts doubt on many 
of the claims that are being made in the English debate. 
 
Rather than simply heralding the advantages of localism, it is more sensible to attempt an 
assessment of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats associated with 
devolution both in principle and in practice in England. For instance, one of the perceived – 
and on the face of it convincing – advantages of devolution is that it allows more ‘joined-up’ 
or better coordinated public policies, overcoming problems of delivering separate public 
policies through central government departments and agencies (the policy ‘silo’ problem) by 
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having  a clear territorial focus for policy. But, ‘joining up’ policy can give rise threats as well 
as opportunities. For instance, Sir Hugh Taylor, former permanent secretary at the 
Department of Health, has highlighted some perceived drawbacks of regional decision-
making in a context of austerity:  
‘I’m nervous that we’ll be trading road maintenance services for health as cash limits 
bite. My worry is that mixing up budgets will lead to reductionism not improvement. 
Devolution mustn’t displace the big issues facing health where we are still trying to 
run the cheapest system in the developed world and making savings’.4  
The issues at stake here are not merely technocratic ones but have an inherently political 
character. Devolution in a context of austerity raises the probability of invidious decisions 
about cuts being the order of the day rather than efficiency gains through better joining-up.  
 
Financing devolution 
The claim that devolution will give rise to an ‘economic dividend’ figures strongly as a trope 
in the current debate. But the evidence suggests that the nature of any dividend is contingent 
upon the context in which it is introduced. The key issue at stake is the degree to which 
devolved systems are accompanied by fiscal mechanisms of territorial redistribution. George 
Osborne’s announcement in October 2015 that full control of business rates would be 
devolved to local councils, along with the power to reduce (but not raise) them, was 
welcomed by the Taxpayer’s Alliance which argues that it would lead to lower overall rates as 
local authorities competed for investment: ‘All the evidence shows that increased tax 
competition between jurisdictions will mean lower taxes - which will leave more money for 
businesses to spend on investing and growing’.5  
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In many strongly devolved states, however, national governments place limits on the degree 
to which jurisdictions can compete through tax incentives in order to prevent wasteful forms 
of competition that benefit mobile firms rather than local taxpayers. These rules are 
replicated at the EU scale even if sometimes they are breached in practice. In the German 
case, for instance, strong structures of sub-national government, notably in the form of the 
Länder and strong city governments, exist alongside explicit and transparent mechanisms that 
transfer resources from economically stronger to economically weaker regions.  
 
In federal states such as Brazil or the United States, where there are few if any limits on 
fiscally-based territorial competition, there is evidence that economic development strategies 
based on ever greater cuts to business taxes or generous financial incentives to mobile 
investors, supports a race to the bottom. In the US, several of the states with the most 
deregulated labour markets and lowest taxation rates are among the poorest, while the gap 
between the richest and poorest states in widening. Counter-intuitively, from the perspective 
of the ruling English orthodoxy, a recent analysis shows that high tax, heavily regulated 
Minnesota, has out-performed, low tax, minimally regulated Wisconsin, according to the 
main social and economic indicators.6  
 
In England an attempt is underway to create a system of devolution that embeds it within a 
strong centrally imposed tax cutting agenda. Meanwhile,  the devolution of business rates will 
work to the advantage of those areas best placed to attract new businesses allowing them to 
expand their tax base and fund local services and invest in infrastructure that, in absence of 
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fiscal solidarity, are likely to lead to greater regional inequality. This outcome is strongly 
feared by some – if not all – local authority leaders in the north of England7.  
 
Democratic renewal or post-democracy?  
The impact of devolution on democratic renewal is similarly contingent on the forms of 
decentralisation that are adopted. Central to the emerging English model is the role of the 
directly-elected Mayor.  In the absence of convincing evidence about the impact of directly-
elected Mayors on local economic growth and the improvement of local services, many of the 
claims made in the English debate rest on more or less persuasive anecdotes drawn principally 
from the US experience, and the limited experience in London.8 A frequent assertion in the 
debate about Mayors is that they have proved successful in the management of US cities. For 
instance, the economic resurgence of New York City is often attributed to the pro-business 
policies of ‘strong mayors’ such as Michael Bloomberg.  
 
Rather less attention, however, is devoted to counterfactuals. We might look at the case of 
Detroit where ‘strong mayors’ have presided over a vicious circle of economic decline and 
municipal bankruptcy. In contrast to the claims of Grant Thornton/Localis, a high degree of 
local self-financing, far from ensuing resilience, was arguably a causal factor in the precipitous 
decline of Detroit. The Mayoral system is in crisis in Detroit. In 2013, the 65th Mayor of Detroit, 
Kwame Kilpatrick, was sentenced to 28 years in prison after being convicted of a variety of 
corruption charges. The city of Detroit filed for bankruptcy in 2013 and the State of Michigan 
appointed an emergency manger to assume control the council. Strong Mayors can lead to 
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hubris and over-reach and be the antithesis of models policymaking based on deliberation 
and increased accountability and scrutiny.  
 
Mayors have managed both the rapid recent growth of New York City and the catastrophic 
decline of Detroit. Isolating the influence of Mayors amongst the many others factors at work 
in these cases is very difficult. One thing can be said with certainty is that the Mayors have 
not presided over an era of a democratic renewal. On the contrary the US mayoral system has 
been associated with declining levels of electoral participation in the big cities. At the time 
Robert F Wagner Jnr was elected as Mayor of New York City in 1953 voter turnout was over 
90 per cent. By the time Bill de Blasio was elected 109th mayor in 2013; voter turnout was less 
than 30 per cent. Similar rates of decline in voter turnout can be seen in cities such as 
Philadelphia, Los Angeles and Chicago.9 These declines in voter turnouts have occurred, 
moreover, in cities that are endowed with much more extensive local media than northern 
English cities. The rapid decline in the quality and quantity of local media in English cities 
makes the predictions of Grant Thornton/Localism, reported above, look highly optimistic. 
 
A key feature of the US mayoral model concerns the way it facilitates close relationships 
between local political and business elites in ways which typically lack transparency and 
scrutiny and which underpin models of economic development that favour urban property 
interests. It is this aspect of the US model which seems to have had a particular influence in 
UK policy debates. For instance, at the 2015 Conservative Party conference in Manchester, 
George Osborne proposed that where elected mayors had been created they would have the 
power to add a (capped) infrastructure levy on business rates. There is considerable 
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uncertainty about how both the devolution of business rates and the infrastructure levy 
would work in practice, but the government is clear that a levy can only be raised if a majority 
of ‘business members’ of the boards of Local Enterprise Partnerships agree. In effect, 
resources will only be allowed to be spent on infrastructure projects that are approved by a 
handful of ‘business leaders’. It might fairly be asked why the interests of a small number of 
appointed business people should trump the mandate of an elected Mayor. It might even be 
argued that this development represents a partial return of the franchise property 
qualification which was abolished by the Representation of the People Act in 1918. 
 
Deal-making and devolution 
The new devolution arrangements are not the product of wide public debate in the areas to 
be affected by them, but instead are the outcomes of ‘secret deals’ (City Deals, ‘Devolutions 
Deals’, etc.) between political and business elites at the national and local scales, exemplified 
in the case of Manchester.10  In essence, these deals are assembled locally from a menu of 
policies approved by HM Treasury.  It stretches the imagination to see this approach as 
leading to meaningful democratic renewal. On the contrary, the model of devolution 
currently on offer is one designed to advance a narrowly defined set of business interests with 
very little democratic scrutiny.   
 
Underpinning the new policy is a theory of economic development that fosters inter-urban 
competition and economic concentration, tolerates and indeed even celebrates high levels of 
socio-economic inequality, is comfortable with some groups and places being losers and locks 
in enduring austerity, most especially in the places that have borne the brunt of public 
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expenditure cuts to date. Innovation and entrepreneurialism in economic development is 
tolerated only within a highly restricted range of parameters. It is a form of devolution in 
which ‘business’ exercises a direct and indirect veto over the preferences of citizens. The 
emerging settlement is akin to the model of ‘post-democracy’, as elaborated by Colin Crouch, 
whereby formal mechanisms of accountability exist, but their practical role is increasingly 
limited and embodies the interest of a small elite.11  
 
Limits of devolution 
In an especially revealing set of remarks, one of the principal architects of the new orthodoxy 
went so far as to disavow the very mention of devolution as a description of the emerging 
policy regime. According to Lord Heseltine, 
 
This is a partnership concept. Central governments are elected and they are entitled 
to have their manifestos implemented and it cannot be contemplated there is a sense 
of freedom at a local level which can actually frustrate the clear mandates upon which 
governments are elected….I am sympathetic to the word partnership rather than 
‘freedom’ or ‘devolution’.12  
 
Far from creating Brandeis’ ‘laboratories of democracy’, England is moving in the direction of 
an idiosyncratic, uneven and highly centralised form of multi-level government where 
devolved policymaking is approved only if it meets the criteria of central government (or 
precisely the Treasury), and often individual ministerial approval and selected business 
interests. It is likely to lead to a patchwork of governance arrangements that place many 
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stresses on a shrinking central government as it seeks to manage a proliferation of local 
‘deals’.  
 
Work by the OECD has identified the factors that are likely to limit the effectiveness of multi-
level governance systems. Among these are asymmetries of information, lack of local 
technical capacity, insufficient funding, enduring policy fragmentation and a lack of 
transparency and accountability. The requirements for overcoming these coordination and 
capacity gaps includes, instruments for revealing and sharing information, significant 
investments in local capacity building, shared financing mechanisms and clear procedures for 
ensuring the integrity of governance systems and citizen involvement13. The ad-hoc, 
secretive, deal-based approach to devolution currently being introduced in England, together 
with the absence of mechanisms to manage inter-governmental relations, the eschewing of 
transparent and formal procedures of decision-making and the reliance on inter-personal 
relationships to manage the disbursement of significant amounts of public money, should be 
raising far more public concern than it has to date.  
 
Conclusion 
There are two central elements of the Conservative government’s case for its particular 
approach to devolution. First, the rhetorical assertion that England is the most highly 
centralised country in the OECD and would benefit from increased democratic accountability 
at the sub-national level. Second, it is claimed that devolution will contribute to the 
rebalancing of regional economies through the creation of a (vaguely defined) ‘Northern 
Powerhouse’ or ‘Midlands Engine’. However, the democratic advances involved in this 
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approach are minimal at best and its underpinning economics are regressive. A strong 
argument could be made that, whatever their other weaknesses, there was more substance 
and resource attached to the Regional Development Agencies and the Northern Way project 
of the previous Labour government. To the extent that any significant policy proposals can be 
identified in relation to the ‘Northern Powerhouse’ – such as improving east-west transport 
links to increase the size of the Manchester labour market – these were filched from existing 
programmes and dressed up as new policy departures.  
 
Given this lack of substance in the government’s policy, what accounts for its relative 
marketing success (#NorthernPowerhouse)? The answer probably lies in the fact that it has 
been personally adopted by the Chancellor, George Osborne, and deployed as a highly 
effective branding strategy and political tactic to divide and rule northern Labour controlled 
cities which are encouraged to compete with each other for speculative property deals that 
accelerate the development of their city centres, even if this model of economic change is 
contributing to rising levels of economic inequality and associated social tensions. The likely 
winners in this intra-Northern competition, unsurprisingly, are the greatest enthusiasts for 
this approach.  
 
None of this is to deny the case for devolving power in England – that case is strong in 
principle. Nor is it to deny that selected aspects of the localist agenda in some contexts – for 
instance at the neighbourhood scale – may open spaces for citizens to assert their interest in 
the face of unresponsive bureaucracies. But the overall lines of tendency in the policy agenda 
suggest such developments will remain at the margins. There is more than one type of 
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devolution. The impacts are of decentralisation are contingent upon its design. As the World 
Bank argues: 
 
… [decentralisation programmes] can be successful or unsuccessful depending  on 
how they are implemented ... Arguing about whether decentralization should happen 
is largely irrelevant; the way it is implemented will determine how successful it is … 
decentralization is almost always politically motivated … [and] … devising a successful 
decentralization strategy is complex because decision makers do not always fully 
control the decentralization process.14 
 
Devolution programmes can be designed to meet different objectives. In England, the 
government is creating a system of devolution that is embedded within a centrally imposed 
tax cutting agenda, concentrates power in closed political and businesses elites and facilitates 
inter-jurisdictional competition. It is possible to envisage an alternative model of devolution 
based on fiscal solidarity and a genuine attempt to extend democratic accountability. This is 
not on offer by any party in England for the time being. In the meantime, those civic forces 
interested in a different kind of devolution might focus on making the case for a more 
transparent, accountable and economically sustainable alternative that rests on firm 
foundations of democratic legitimacy. As major changes are made to local and regional 
governance in England they can hardly be said to reflect the ‘settled will’ of the English people. 
To paraphrase G.K. Chesterton, the people of England have not spoken yet. Indeed, they have 
yet to be asked their opinion and there are no plans to do so. 
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